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"America's publicly owned companies control the disposition of
the great bulk of our nation's productive facilities. The manner in
which the directors of those companies are selected, and the manner in
which that selection is legitimized, are therefore matters of intense
concern to all of us.'
There is, of course, no secret about how the directors of America's
publicly-owned companies are selected. Generally, they are selected by
the managers and the other directors, although there are instances
where particular directors are chosen to represent the interests of
substantial shareholders, 2 creditors, customers or other parties inter-
ested in the conduct of the company's affairs. In most cases, selection
is legitimized by submitting the names of the nominees to the share-
holders for ratification. The nominees, or some of them, appear at a
quaint ritual, called the "annual meeting," to submit to questions, and
perhaps some taunts, from assembled shareholders.
The focus of this book, however, is on the situation that arises
when another self-chosen group of men decide that they would like to
take over the management of a particular company. The result is a
contest to see which side can obtain proxies from the holders of a
majority of the shares. Shares are held by individuals, of various ages
and persuasions, by banks and brokers for the accounts of individuals,
by other corporations, and, to a rapidly increasing extent, by so-called
"institutional investors"-pension funds, investment companies, in-
surance companies, charitable and educational institutions, and other
types of arrangements under which the people who vote the shares
have no other beneficial interest in them. To ascertain what influence,
if any, these different classes of investors have or could have on corpo-
rate policies and selection of management, one would like to know
what attitudes they take in proxy contests and to what types of appeals
they respond in choosing between opposing groups of candidates.
Unfortunately, that is not what this book is all about. Beyond the
brief suggestion that the most effective issues for insurgents are those
1 P. xiii (opening sentences of Introduction by Manuel F. Cohen, former Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
2 In Feder v. Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), one corporation was held
liable for short-swing profits as a "director" of another corporation under Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964), on the ground that it had
"deputized" its president to represent its interests on the board of the other corporation.
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based on poor earnings and dividends or attacks on the integrity of
management, 3 and that management can best respond by undertaking
"a dramatic new program which will have stockholder appeal," 4 there
is no analysis of the substance of these political struggles for control of
the governmental apparatus of the corporations.5
This is a book for people who are involved in proxy contests
rather than for people who want to study them.6 As might be expected,
the temptations presented by the perquisites of corporate management
have led both insurgents and incumbent managements to employ
"often reckless, uninformative, or misleading charges and counter-
charges," to the point that the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1956 adopted special rules applicable to election contests to supple-
ment the rules applicable to proxy solicitations generally.8 It is with
the operation of these rules, as well as with the state laws governing
the conduct of election meetings, inspection of stockholder lists and
similar matters, that Aranow and Einhorn are principally concerned.
They also cover the availability of judicial remedies, the expenses of
proxy contests, and the resources available for various types of proxy
solicitation. Their book is a thoroughly professional, well-organized
and well-written guide to the legal and procedural aspects of proxy
contests.
Both the preface and the introduction claim increased significance
for the proxy rules as a result of developments since the first edition
of the book appeared in 1957. The most notable developments were
the 1964 amendments extending federal proxy regulation to more
than three thousand large companies whose securities are traded over
the counter," and the Supreme Court's holding in J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak10 that a shareholder could enjoin corporate action based on
proxies solicited in violation of SEC rules. But, as a result of more
recent developments which the authors also note, the proxy contest in
its pure form has in the past couple of years become a distinctly
secondary, and is perhaps on its way to becoming a largely obsolete,
3 P. 11.
4 P. 24.
5 The book might be compared to a study of the American electoral process which
focused primarily on the procedures and decisions of the Fair Campaign Practices
Committee.
6 That is presumably what justifies a price of $35.00 for a book with approximately
600 pages of text.
7 P. xiv.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1968).
9 Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964).
10 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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road to control of a publicly-held company. Outsiders have discovered
that it may be a lot easier, and indeed cheaper, to buy up a majority
of the shares of the target company than to solicit the votes of its
present shareholders. Also, while the loser in a proxy contest has
nothing to show for his time and expense but some worthless pieces
of paper, the loser in a purchase contest is often able to sell out his
interest to the winner for a tidy profit.1 As against twenty-seven proxy
contests filed with the SEC during the year ended July 31, 1968,12
there were an estimated two hundred forty-nine tender offers during
1968 seeking a controlling or substantial interest in a publicly-held
company.13 Many of these tender offers, needless to say, have evidenced
the same kinds of "reckless, uninformative, or misleading charges and
countercharges" that had characterized proxy contests. The congres-
sional response was the enactment in July 1968 of amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposing disclosure requirements,
comparable to those found in the proxy rules, on anyone who solicits
shareholders to accept or reject a tender offer.' 4 Aranow and Einhorn
have a brief closing chapter on tender offers, and much of their dis-
cussion of the standards applied by the SEC staff to disclosures in
proxy statements will also be applicable when disclosures in connection
with tender offers are being reviewed by the same staff.
Of course, the rise of the tender offer has thoroughly exposed (if
indeed any further exposure was needed) the ineffectiveness of the
present shareholder voting requirement, based as it is on the rule of
"one share, one vote," in placing any "democratic" limitations on the
selection or activities of corporate managers. A system in which a man
or company can win an election by buying up a majority of the votes
can hardly be called democracy, no matter how broadly that term is
defined. In the past, there has been at least a plausible argument that
the large shareholder was entitled to more votes because of his larger
stake in the company's operations, but now that accomplished take-
over artists have learned how to buy up a company's shares by using
the company's own assets, 15 the substance of that argument has been
hollowed out even further.16
11 See Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 79, 158, 161.
12 1968 SEC ANN. R'EP. 42.
13 Burck, supra note 11, at 80.
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d) (Supp. 1969), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
15 See Burck, supra note 11, at 158.
16 The "corporate democracy" myth still has a firm hold, however. The New York
Stock Exchange recently expressed concern over the tactics adopted by incumbent
managements to thwart prospective take-overs by establishing insurmountable voting
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There have been some suggestions of movement, but so far very few
concrete steps, toward the objective of making corporate managers
more responsible to their various classes of constituents through truly
democratic procedures. Those steps may yet be some distance off, and
if you are involved in the proxy contest game, Aranow and Einhorn
give you the rules that govern it at the present time.
David L. Ratner*
requirements for mergers and similar transactions, on the ground that these measures
would tend to discriminate against certain shareholders. See Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1969, at
6, col. 2; id. Feb. 21, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
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